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Summary
Over the past few years, there has been increased speculation about Cuba’s future
without Fidel Castro, who has ruled the country since the 1959 Cuban revolution.
Castro turned 79 on August 13, 2005, and while over the years news of his imminent
demise proved premature, his advanced age makes the date of his departure from the
political scene all the closer.  The U.S. government has begun to plan in various ways
for Cuba without Fidel at the helm.  This has included examining transition issues and
appointing a State Department Cuba Transition Coordinator.  Some observers, however,
question the adequacy of the transition planning, in part because it does not recognize
the likelihood of a successor communist government headed by Fidel’s brother Raúl.
This report first examines various transition scenarios for Cuba after Fidel Castro.  It
then examines implications of the transition for U.S. policy, including U.S. government
preparation and current legislative conditions for dealing with a new government. This
report will not be updated.  For further information on Cuba, including current
legislative initiatives, see CRS Report RL32730, Cuba: Issues for the 109th Congress;
and CRS Report RL31139, Cuba: U.S. Restrictions on Travel and Remittances. 
Transition Scenarios
Despite the introduction of limited economic reforms since the early 1990s, Cuba
under Castro has remained a hard-line communist state since 1959.  Soon after ousting
the corrupt government of Fulgencio Batista from power, Castro laid the foundation for
an authoritarian regime by consolidating power and forcing moderates out of government.
In April 1961, Castro conceded that the Cuban revolution was socialist, and in December
1961 he proclaimed himself to be a Marxist Leninist.  From 1959 until 1976, Castro ruled
by decree. In 1976, his government adopted a constitution, later amended in 1992 and
2002, which set forth the Communist Party as the leading force in the state and society.
The 2002 amendments stated that “socialism and the revolutionary political and social
system in the Constitution ... are irrevocable, and Cuba will never again return to
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capitalism.”1  Castro dominates the Communist Party through his position as first
secretary of the Political Bureau, the party’s leading decision-making institution. He
dominates the government through his position as President of the Council of Ministers,
the highest executive branch authority, and as President of the Council of State, which
makes legislative decisions on behalf of the National Assembly of People’s Power when
it is not in session (most of the time since the Assembly only meets twice a year for short
periods). As President of the Council of State, Castro is head of state and head of
government.2
Fidel’s brother Raúl, as First Vice President of the Council of State, is the officially
designated successor (pursuant to Article 94 of the Constitution), and would become head
of state and head of government with Fidel’s departure. Raúl — who turned 74 in June
2005 — also serves as First Vice President of the Council of Ministers, as Minister of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), and as second secretary of the Communist Party.
His position in the party was confirmed at the last congress held in October 1997 during
which Fidel publicly endorsed Raúl as his political successor. 
There are several potential scenarios for Cuba’s future when Fidel Castro either dies
in office or departs the political scene because of age or declining heath.3  These fit into
three broad categories: the continuation of a communist government; a military
government; or a democratic transition or fully democratic government.  
Successor Communist Government.  According to most observers, the most
likely scenario, at least in the short term, is a successor communist government led by
Raúl Castro.   This is true for a variety of reasons, but especially because of Raúl’s
designation by Fidel as successor in the party and his position as leader of the FAR,
which, since 1989, has been in control of the government’s security apparatus (police,
intelligence, and security services) within the Ministry of the Interior.  For many
observers, Raúl’s strong support from the FAR, which has played an increasing role in
Cuba’s economy in the 1990s (through ownership of numerous business enterprises) is
the most significant factor ensuring that he will succeed his brother.  Some see the likely
prospect of Cuba under Raúl following a Chinese model, with increases in economic
freedom, albeit with continued political authoritarianism.  Some observers contend that
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the transition has already begun, with Raúl assuming increasing responsibility in policy
decisions and day-to-day government management.4  Some observers, however, question
whether Raúl has the charisma and force of personality that have helped sustain his
brother in power for so long.  They maintain that divisions within the Communist Party
could be exacerbated when Fidel is no longer in power.  Moreover, some maintain that
Raúl’s age will make him a transitional figure, and contribute to increased competition
for power within the party.
Although the Cuban government has been dominated by Fidel Castro, analysts have
discerned three factions or political tendencies that help explain political dynamics in
Cuba: hardliners, centrists, and reformists.5  At the helm, Fidel and his strong supporters
(many from the early days of the revolution, but also including younger Cubans, such as
Foreign Minister Felipe Perez Roque) are considered hardliners or duros, those opposed
to fundamental political or economic change.  Centrists are those who support some
market-based solutions to the country’s economic problems, but do not espouse wholesale
Western-style capitalism.  Most significantly, centrists do not challenge the supremacy
of the Communist Party and do not advocate political reform. Observers have placed Raúl
Castro and the FAR in this category because of the significant market-oriented policies
utilized by the army in its administration of military and civilian businesses.  Finally,
reformists — who have been scarce in recent years — prefer a more aggressive move
toward a market-oriented economy and political liberalization that might allow a loyal
opposition to operate, although within the context of the current regime maintaining
power.  Over the years, several prominent reformists have been ousted from their
positions, such as Foreign Minister Roberto Robaina and former Communist Party
Secretary Carlos Aldana.  A prominent reformer who has remained in power is Carlos
Lage, who serves as Secretary of the Council of Ministers and as Vice President on the
Council of State.  Lage has been responsible for Cuba’s limited market-oriented reforms.
In recent years, hardliners have dominated government policy, as demonstrated by
Cuba’s strong crackdown on dissidents and by the backtracking on some of the limited
economic reforms enacted in the 1990s, but some observers maintain that the various
divisions within the party will re-emerge once Fidel is no longer on the scene.   Moreover,
they contend that the prospects of a democratic transition in the long-term could depend
on whether the reformers will predominate after Fidel is gone.6  
Military Government.  The scenario of a military-led government is viewed by
some observers as a possibility only if a successor communist government fails because
of divisiveness or political instability.  In this scenario, the military would step in to
restore order and control. Absent political instability, it is unlikely that the military would
step in to control the government directly since the FAR has had a tradition of deference
to civilian control under Cuba’s communist government.   Moreover, with Raúl Castro
heading a communist government, active and retired military officers would likely play
significant roles in various ministries and institutions.  While a military government is
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unlikely, some observers contend that the FAR, as Cuba’s most powerful institution and
with a large role in the economy, will play an instrumental role in any transition scenario.
Democratic Government.  For many observers, the least likely scenario upon
Fidel’s death or departure is a democratic or democratic transition government.  With a
strong totalitarian security apparatus, the Castro government has successfully impeded the
development of independent civil society, with only a small and tightly regulated private
sector, no independent labor movement, and no unified political opposition.  Although
Cuba’s dissident and human rights movement has grown in recent years, with such
movements as the Varela Project and the Assembly to Promote Civil Society receiving
international attention, these groups are not widely known in Cuba.   In the long run, the
work of the dissident and human rights community may play an important role in shaping
a future democratic government, but in the short to medium term, it appears that a
communist successor government would be far more likely.  Unlike Eastern Europe’s
former communist governments, the Castro government sprang from an indigenous
revolution, not one imposed by an outside power.
U.S. Policy Implications
U.S. Policy Tied to Fulfillment of Democratic Conditions.   Since the early
1960s, U.S. policy toward Cuba has consisted largely of isolating the communist
government of Fidel Castro through comprehensive economic sanctions, including an
embargo on trade and financial transactions.  The sanctions were made stronger with the
enactment of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114),
which sets forth a number of conditions for the suspension and ultimate termination of the
embargo.  For the suspension of the embargo, these conditions require that a transition
government: does not include Fidel or Raúl Castro; has legalized all political activity; has
released all political prisoners; has dissolved several coercive elements of state security;
has made commitments to free and fair elections for a new government in 18 months; has
ceased interference with Radio and TV Marti broadcasts; is making demonstrable
progress in establishing an independent judiciary, respecting internationally recognized
human rights and basic freedoms, and allowing the establishment of independent trade
unions and social, economic, and political associations; and has given assurances that it
will allow the speedy and efficient distribution of assistance to the Cuban people.  The
actual termination of the embargo would require additional conditions, including, most
significantly, that an elected civilian government is in power.   
The dilemma for U.S. policy is that the current legislative conditions just described
could tie the hands of policymakers if political change does not unfold swiftly toward a
democratic transition.  Under the more likely scenario of a future communist government,
the U.S. sanctions-based policy would remain in place until these conditions were fulfilled
or until legislation was enacted superceding the language of the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act.  The conditions could prevent the United States from
responding quickly to political change in Cuba or influencing a future communist regime
with reformist tendencies.   Some argue, however, that it is important for Congress to
keep these conditions in place so that the President does not back away from support for
democracy in Cuba.  At this juncture, as set forth in the legislative conditions, Congress
and the Administration essentially agree that change in U.S. sanctions policy toward Cuba
will only be precipitated by substantial movement toward democracy.
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U.S. Government Preparation. For a number of years, the U.S. government has
been making efforts to prepare for a political transition in Cuba.  Pursuant to the Cuban
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-114, Section 202(g)), the
Clinton Administration submitted a report to Congress in January 1997 on “Support for
a Democratic Transition in Cuba,” which outlined the assistance that Cuba would likely
seek during a democratic transition and ways in which the United States and the
international community could provide assistance.  The report made broad
recommendations regarding potential U.S. support to help Cuba consolidate its
democratic political transition and to advance economic recovery and transition. 7
Since 1997, the U.S. government has provided assistance — primarily through the
U.S. Agency for International Development — for projects aimed at promoting a
democratic transition in Cuba.  Much of the assistance is aimed at supporting the
development of an independent civil society in Cuba, but it has also included specific
assistance for examining Cuba’s transition.  This has included $3 million in grants since
2002 to fund a Cuba Transition Project at the University of Miami.8  The project funds
studies examining and making recommendations for Cuba’s reconstruction once the post-
Castro transition begins.
More recently, the Bush Administration established an inter-agency Commission for
Assistance to a Free Cuba in October 2003 to help plan for Cuba’s transition from
communism to democracy, and help identify ways to help bring it about.  Chaired by then
Secretary of State Colin Powell, the Commission consisted of five working groups
focused on: hastening Cuba’s transition; meeting basic human needs; establishing
democratic institutions, respect for human rights, rule of law, and justice and
reconciliation; establishing the core institutions for a free democracy; and modernizing
infrastructure and addressing environmental degradation.  
In May 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by
the Commission, which made recommendations for immediate measures to “hasten the
end of Cuba’s dictatorship” as well as longer-term recommendations to help plan for
Cuba’s transition from communism to democracy in the various areas covered by the five
working groups.9  The President directed that up to $59 million be committed to
implement key recommendations of the Commission, including additional support for
democracy-building activities and for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba.
Some of the report’s most controversial recommendations included a number of measures
to tighten economic sanctions on family visits and other categories of travel and on
private humanitarian assistance in the form of remittances and gift parcels.10  Subsequent
regulations issued by the Treasury and Commerce Departments in June 2004 implemented
these new sanctions.  The Commission report stipulated that the assistance to a transition
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government described in the report would be predicated on Cuba’s success in fulfilling
the democratic conditions set forth in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act.
  
In late July 2005, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice appointed Caleb McCarry as
the State Department’s new Cuba Transition Coordinator to direct U.S. government
“actions in support of a free Cuba.”   Appointment of the Coordinator, as set forth in the
Commission’s May 2004 report, is intended to send a signal of the unwillingness of the
United States to accept the Cuban government’s succession strategy.  The Coordinator is
tasked with facilitating expanded implementation of democracy projects and regular
planning for future transition assistance contingencies.
U.S. government preparations for a Cuba transition have several policy implications.
The Cuba Commission’s report sets forth a strategy of undermining the Cuban
government’s succession strategy, and as noted in the report, “the United States rejects
the continuation of a communist dictatorship in Cuba.”  When the report was issued,
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Roger Noriega asserted in
public comments that “the United States.....will not accept a succession scenario.”11  As
noted above, however, the most likely scenario for a post-Fidel Cuba is a successor
communist government headed by Raúl Castro.  Some observe that open U.S. policy to
undermine Cuba’s transition process could reduce the likelihood of U.S. influence in a
post-Fidel government, and might not be in the best interest of ensuring an orderly and
peaceful transition.   Moreover, the disruption of an orderly transition could unleash a host
of potential problems for the United States, including the possibility of mass migration
from Cuba that has occurred in the past during times of economic and political crisis.   
Some observers also have questioned the Administration’s planning because they
believe it attempts to micro-manage the transition by providing the minutiae of what the
United States would like to see in a new post-Fidel Cuba. For some, this feeds the Cuban
government’s rhetoric that the United States wants to take over Cuba, and runs the risk
of stirring Cuban nationalism and alienating the Cuban population.  For example, the
detailed transition plans elicited a negative response from several prominent dissidents
such as Oswaldo Payá and Elizardo Sanchez, who maintain that the future transition
should be coordinated and run by Cubans.  Some dissidents as well as some in the Cuban
American community also strongly criticized measures in the Commission’s report
adopted by the Administration that further restricted family travel and the provision of
remittances and gift parcels to Cuba.  They judged that these new sanctions hurt the
Cuban people, including the dissident community, instead of the Cuban government.
Others, however, defended the Administration’s action as a means of cutting off a source
of financial support for the Cuban government. Legislative efforts to overturn these new
sanctions have failed.12
